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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This IS an appeal from a conviction and sentence for two COLInts of aiding and abetting
first degree murder. I.e. §§ 18-4001, 18-4003(a), and 18-204. R 383, 387. The convictions in
this case should be reversed because the jury was not properly instructed that Mr. Reid could
only be convicted if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with premeditation. The
convictions should also be reversed because of the admission of certain photographs at trial. In
the altemative, the sentence should be vacated because it was based upon unreliable evidence.
B. Procedural History
Appellant. Corey Reid, was charged by information \vith two counts of aiding and
abetting first degree murder in connection with the deaths of Neil Howard and Cindy Bewick.
1011

Kienholz, Jr.. was the principal. R 78 - 79. Mr. Reid \vas comicted and sentenced to a term

of life WIth

.~O

years fixed. R')

. This appeal timely foIl(mcd. R 387.

C. Statement of Facts
On August 8, 2008. Virgil Testky, who was picking berries at Dobson Pass, discovered

the body of Mr. Howard. When he returned with law enforcement. they also found Ms. Bewick's
body. Tr. p. 224, In. 19 - p. 226, Ill. 16.
Jon Kienholz pled guilty to the first degree murder of Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick. Tr.
p. 470, In. I - 10. Per his own testimony, he initially lied to la\v enforcement. Tr. p. 470, In. 2022.

Later, he told the state, ''I'll testify to whatever you want." Following that statement, he

testified against Mr. Reid in order to avoid the death penalty. Tr. p. 650, In. 21 - p. 651, In.IS.
Mr. Kienholz testified that he had recently retumed to Idaho following a stint in the army

1

wherein he received extensive firearms traming. Tr. p. 363, In. 6 - 16. According to Mr.
Kienholz, he and Mr Reid were longtime friends and they, along with Mr. Reid's girlfriend,
Kristin Purtill, and Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick (who were also in a relationship and had a
young son together), were planning to go to Bolivia. Mr. Kienholz intended to make a living
there by selling illegal substances. The plan was very disorganized, but the group had decided to
use Mr. Howard's car for transportation. Tr. p. 364, In. 4 - p. 370, In. 16.
Early in the morning on the day that would end with Mr. Kienholz killing Mr. Howard
and Ms. Bewick, he borrowed Mr. Howard's car. He then picked up Mr. Reid and Ms. Purtill.
Tr. p.

, In. 13 - p. 376, In. 6. They all then picked up Braecyn Wood and drove to Coeur

d' Alene and later to Spokane. Tr. p. 376, In. 14 - 15. Along the way, items were pavmed and

marijuana was purchased. Everyone in tile car was smoking the marijuana. Tr. p. 378, In. 24 - p.
380, In. 4.
Accord,

to 1'\/11'. Kienlwll. during the drive, rvlr. Ki('nholl called Luke Hill and offered

to trade him drugs for the lise of his gUll. Mr. Kienholz dropped everyone off and ,vent to get the
gUll. When he returned. he vvas showing off vvith the gun and he testified that Mr. Reid smiled
and laughed. Tr. p ..181. In. I - p. 385, In. 12.
Everyone next drove to Daryl Bewick's house where Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick were.
When they arrived there, Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick told Mr. Kienholz that Ms. Purtill was
trying to turn them in on outstanding warrants. Mr. Kienholz testified that he told Mr. Reid
about this and Mr. Reid became angry. Tr. p. 394, In. 10 - p. 395, In. 8.
At that time, according to Mr. Kienholz's testimony, he told Mr. Reid and Ms. Purtill that
he could ';snuff the problem out." He also told Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick not to worry
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because he did not think that "there was any \-veight behind their assumption," Tr. p. 395, In. 19

Everyone then got

ITl

Mr. Howard's car and drove to Silverton. The two couples, Mr.

Howard and Ms. Bewick. and Mr. Reid and Ms. Pm1ill, were not speaking. They drove toward
Wayne Barrett's house where, after dropping everyone off at a field, Mr. Kienholz went to get
ammunition for the gun. Mr. Kienholz also picked up a pair of mechanic's gloves which he wore
for the rest of the day. 1'1. p. 397, In. I - p. 400, In. 20.
Following that, Mr. Kienholz got everyone from the field and they drove up to Dobson
Pass. There was again, according to Mr. Kienholz' s testimony, a lot of animosity in the air.
Once at the pass, they went to a campsite and built a rire. Mr. Kienholz made people work
together on this, apparently in an eff0l1 to make peace. Tr. p. 402, In. 1 - p. 404, In. 16.
According to 1'vlr. Kienholz's testimony, after a \\hile. he suggested that he and Mr. Reid
leave the others at the campsite. When he did this. Mr. Howard told Ms. Bewick to get his knife
and this made ,,"1s. Purtill resistant to being

len behind vvith

them. So, only Mr. Howard and lVls.

Bewick were left at the camp. Tr. p. 408. In. 12 - p. 409, In. 25.
Mr. Kiellholz testified that he told !vIr. Reid about the knife and Mr. Reid became irate
and said, ;'We have to kill them." Tr. p. 410, In. 13 - p. 411, In. 16.
The three drove from the camp to Mr. Wood's house, where they dropped off Ms. Purtill
and met Mr. Reid's cousin, Hiram Wilson. Mr. Kienholz did not know Mr. Wilson, but Mr.
Reid told him that Mr. Wilson should be allowed to come along because he was "down for
anything" and also because he had just received money for his birthday. Tr. p. 411, In. 20 - p.

413, In. 23.
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Mr. Kienholz agreed to taking Mr. Wilson along, and he drove Mr. Wilson and Mr. Reid
to Mr. Wilson's siSler's house for Mr. Wilson to get his birthday money. According to 1\11'.
Kienholz, during the drive, Mr. Reid "briefed" Mr. Wilson, telling him that they were going to
kill Mr. Howard and Ms. Be\vick. However, Mr. Wilson did not appear to believe that Mr. Reid
was serious. Tr. 414. In.

p. 416, In. 4.

Mr. Kienholz, in his initial contacts with the police, refened to Mr. Reid and Mr. Wilson
as his soldiers. He also freely told Mr. Wilson and Mr. Wood that he had previously killed
someone in Thailand with his bare hands and bragged about getting away with it. He testified
that he had planned to murder other people besides Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick saying, "but I
don't know who hasn't [made such plans]," and gave as an example of prior plans that he had
planned to murder an ex-gJrlfriend. He also told IY'lL Wilson, prior to murdering Mr. Howard and
Ms. Be,vick, that he had been planning a murder for years. but he just did not kll()\\' who he was
going to murder ami who he \\ as gOlllg to commit the murder \\ Ith.

0Jolletheless. Mr. Kicllholz

testified that he \\as shocked II1tO silence when he heard lVlr. Reid say that they were going to kill
Mr. HO\vard and Ms. Be\vick. Tr. p. 416. In. 4 - 12, p. 471, In 8 -

~5,

p. 640, In. 5 - 15, p. 672,

In. I - p. 673, In. 20, p. ()89. In. 1 - p. 691, In. 8.
Mr. Kienholz testified that after learning of the plan to ki II, Mr. Wi Ison asked to see the
gun and Mr. Reid told him where it was. Mr. Wilson got the gun from the trunk by pulling down
the back seat, and passed It to both Mr. Reid and Mr. Kienholz. The gun was unloaded. Tr. p.
418, In. 3 - p. 419, In. 15. Mr. Kienholz testified that it was just getting dark and they were
driving to Dobson Pass to commit the crime. The gun was put back in the trunk and the plans
were not further discussed. Tr. p. 420, In. 1 - 18.
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At the top of the pass, Mr. Kienholz decided to park the car. Mr. Reid had wanted him to
continue to the campsite, but Mr. Kienholz vetoed the idea. They all got out of the car, and Mr.
Kienholz told Mr. Wilson to get the gun while Mr. Reid got the ammunition. Tr. p. 420, In. 18 p. 421, In. 23.
According to Mr. Kienholz, Mr. Reid

the box of ammunition from the glove box and

removed the individual rounds and handed them to Mr. Kienholz. Mr. Kienholz loaded the gun
and placed it in the small of his back. Mr. Wilson lent Mr. Kienholz a shirt that covered up the
gun. Tr. p,

In.2 - p. 424, In. 15.

According to Mr. Kienholz, the group then walked to the campsite, while Mr. Wilson and
Mr. Kienholz planned out the tactics. But, when they got near the campsite, Mr. Reid suggested
that they just walk up and get it over vvith. Tr. p. 426, In. 3 - 20.
According to Mr. Kienholz, he just did not know vvhat to do, and he kept tellmg himself
that he could defuse the entire situation. But. at the same time, he was bound by a promise he
had made to protect Mr. Reid and Ms. Purtill. Tr. p. 426, In. 25 - p. 427, In. 8.
As they neared the campsite, they saw Mr. Howard, and all three hid in a bush. After a
while, according to Mr. Kienholz, they walked into the campsite where Mr. Kienholz told Mr.
Howard a lie about how they had just robbed a gas station. Tr. p. 428, In. 21 - p. 431, In. 19.
Mr. Kienholz told everyone to stay and focus on the campfire. While they were focusing,
Mr. Kienholz engaged Mr. Howard in conversation asking him to repeatedly guess what was
ironic about the fire. It was at this time that Mr. Kienholz decided that he would not be able to
stop the murders. According to Mr. Kienholz, he looked to Mr. Reid hoping he would have the
strength to stop it, but Mr. Reid silently mouthed, "Come on, do it." In response, Mr. Kienholz
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immediately shot Mr. Howard in the head. Tr. p. 434, In. 7

p. 437, In.

Mr. Howard fell to the ground, and Ms. Bewick lunged at Mr. Kienholz. Mr. Kienholz
kicked her in the head and then shot her. Mr. Kienholz can remember her telling him to stop. He
can also remember Mr. Howard making noises and kicking him to make him stop. Tr. p. 438, In,
12

p. 441, In. 5.
Following this, according to Mr. Kienholz, Mr. Wilson took charge and together he and

Mr. Kienholz drug and threw the bodies off the hi lIside to hide them. During this time, Mr.
Kienholz put a blanket on the fire, \vhich Mr. Reid told him to take off as it would cause smoke
and draw attention to them. Tr. p. 442, In. 16 - p. 446, In. 3.
After this, the three drove to Mr. Wood's hOLlse, where they met Mr. Wood and Ms.
Put1il!. According to ivlr. Kienholz, Mr. Reid told Ms. PurtilL "We did it." The whole group got
in the car and began to drive. However. after a bit, Mr. Wood decided he wanted to go home.

so they drove 11im home. and then the rernaining people drove to Boise. Tr. p. 450, In. 5 - p.

453, In. 6.
The group stayed in Boise for a \vhile. During this time, Mr. Kienholz admits he did
threaten to kill Mr. Reid, hut he believes he immediately apologized and that Mr. Reid \vas not
afraid of him. Tr. p. 492, In. 4 - 24.
Mr. Wilson also testified. He, like Mr. Kienholz, had a plea agreement with the state that
was contingent upon his testimony against Mr. Reid. Tr. p. 575, In. 18 - p. 576, In. 8. The day
he went with Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Reid \vas the day after his seventeenth birthday. Tr. p. 495,
In. 25 - p. 496, In. 8.
His testimony differed from Mr. Kienholz' s. He testified that Mr. Reid told him that day
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that they \""ere going on a road trip to Mexico and invited him along. Mr. Wilson agreed.
However. Mr. Kienholz did not want him to come along until he learned that Mr. Wilson had
some birthday money. Tr. p. 504, In. I - p. 505. In. 9.
Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Reid drove Mr. Wilson to his sister's house to get the money. Mr.
Wilson's sister was rationing the money out and initially gave him just $75. Then Mr. Kienholz
sent him back in and he got another $25. Tr.p.512,ln.1

p.513,ln.ll.

On the way to Mr. Wilson's sister's house, Mr. Reid and Mr. Kienholz (who was called
Bubba) told NIr. Wilson that they had a gun in the trunk. Mr. Kienholz told Mr. Wilson how to
access the trunk and he got the gun out. Then Mr. Kienholz told Mr. Wilson that they were
going to meet Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick. and Mr. Reid said that they needed to kill them. T1'.
p. 508. In. 10 - p. 509. In. 12. Hmvever. M1'. Wilson thought that this was a joke and that they
were not gOIng to kill anyone. Tr. p. 680. In. 23

p. 681. In. 17.

On the \\ ay up to the pass. fvlr. Kienhol; said that he might need to pullover and thl'O'v\
up because it is not everyday that you kill someone. but Mr. Reid told him that he was a pussy.
Tr.p.516.1n.5

10.

1\11'. Wilson testified that on the way to the pass. Mr. Kienholz and M1'. Reid discLlssed
how they wanted to proceed and that they disagreed ahout where to park. Tr. p. 517, In. 16 23.
Contrary to Mr. Kienholz. Mr. Wilson helieved that it was M1'. Reid and Mr. Kienholz
who discussed tactics. not him and Mr. Kienholz. T1'. p. 523. In. 15

p. 524, In. 18. Mr. Wilson

also believed that after Mr. Reid gave M1'. Kienholz ammunition. he put some extra hullets in his
pockets in case Mr. Kienholz missed. During the walk from the car to the campsite, Mr. Reid
suggested that they just steal the car and leave Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick hehind, as they
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could not do anything to stop the theft because they could not go to the police given their
outstanding warrants. Mr. Kienholz did not respond to this suggestion. Tr. p. 519, In. 4

15, p.

678, In. 20 p. 679. In. 9.

But, Mr. Wilson agrees that they all wound up hiding in a bush At that point Mr.
Kienholz wanted to sneak up over a ridge and hide in the bushes and shoot llsing the light of the
fire. However, Mr. Reid said it ,-,vould be better to just walk into the camp and shoot. Tr. p. 524,
In. 24 - p. 526. In. 10.
They ultimately decided to walk into the camp and when they got there, Mr. Reid, Mr.
Howard, and Mr. Kienholz discussed the plan to go to Mexico. Then, Mr. Kienholz engaged Mr.
HO\vard in a discLlssion abollt the fire. And, then he finally said that there was going to be a lot of
fire \vhere Mr. Howard was going and shot Mr. Howard. Tr. p. 533, In. 3 p. 534, In. 16.
Mr. Kienholz also kicked and shot Ms. Bewick and then shot Mr. Howard again. Tr. p .
.'i36, In. 15

21.

After thIS, Mr. Kienholz ordered Mr. Wilson to help him move the bodies, which he did.
Tr. p. 540, In.

J

p. 541, In. 8.

On cross examination. Mr. Wilson clarified his testimony and explained that up until Mr.
Kienholz started the conversation with Mr. HO\vard about why a fire is ironic, he did not believe
that a murder was really planned. He believed that Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Reid were playing
some kind of sick joke. Tr. p. 580, In. 24 p. 58 I, In. 3. He did not know Mr. Kienholz, but he
did know Mr. Reid and he simply did not think
Tr. p. 678, In. 7

~'1r.

Reid could do anything like killing someone.

10. Throughout, it was absolutely clear that Mr. Kienholz was the leader. He

gave orders that Mr. Reid and Mr. Wilson obeyed. Tr. p. 577, In. 23
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p. 578, In. 10

Further, Mr. Wilson clarified that at the fire, Mr. Reid did not gesture to M1'. Kienholz nor
did he mouth anything. During that time, Mr. Reid was actually standing behind Mr. Kienholz.
Tr. p. 579, In. 5
Mr. Wilson also testified that \vhen the group was in Boise, M1'. Kienholz threatened to
kill Mr. Reid. He did not appear to be joking and he did not apologize after making the threat.
Tr. p. 677, In. 4

10.

After some lime in Boise, Mr. Wilson took the Greyhound Bus hack to his home and
went to the police. Tr. p. 560, In. 12

20. Mr. Kienholz also made his way back to North Idaho,

to his mother's, \\'here she took him to the police. Tr. p. 471. In. 1 7.
Mr. Reid and Ms. PUI1ill remained in Meridian with the car. The police located the car
and a search \varranl was secured. \Vhen they went to serve the search warrant, Mr. Reid and
Ms. Purlill cooperated with them and Mr. Reid. upon questioning, told the police that the gun
from North Idaho was still in thc trunk. T1'. p. S()l). In. 14

p.

sn. In.

18.

In closing. the defense argued that while there was no douht that ~'1r. Kicnholz murdered
Mr. Hmvarcl and [\-1s. Bewick. the evidence of that murder had to be distinguished from the
evidencc offered to suppol1 the aiding and abetting charges against M1'. Reid. And, given the
inconsistencies in the testimony of Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Wilson, and the evidcnce that Mr.
Kienholz was clearly the leader and rejected Mr. Reid's suggestion that the group just steal the
car and leave. Mr. Kienholz's and Mr. Wilson's credibility problems, and the need for
corroboration of accomplice testimony, that the state had not proven Mr. Reid gUilty. In
particular, the defense focused on the fai lure of the state to prove that M1'. Reid acted with
premeditation. Tr. p. 724, In. 15

741, In. 6
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At tbe end of the trial, the jury convicted Mr. Reid of both counts of aiding and abetting.
Tr. p. 752, In. I

24.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIE\V
I. Did the failure to instruct the jury that it must find that Mr. Reid had the mental state
of premeditation violate the constitutional guarantees of due process and ajury trial? U.S. Const.
Amend. 5,6, and 14: Idaho Const. alt. 1,

~§

7 and 13.

2. Were non-probative yet highly prejudicial photographs erroneously admitted?
3. Did the district court err in basing the sentence on unreliable evidence'?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Fai lure to Properlv Instruct the J urv As to Premeditation Requires Reversal

I. Relevant Facts
The jury was given the follov,ing instructions:
Instruction 17
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Count l, Aiding and Abetting First
fl;:
, the statc must
e each of
folIrming:

I. On or ahout the

41h

day of August. 2008:

2. In the State of Idaho:
3. Jon Allen Kienholz, Jf., did without justi fication or excuse,
4. Willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, and
5. With malice aforethought and premeditation,
6. Kill Neil Howard, a human being, and
7. The Defendant, COREY SKU REID, aided and abetted in the commission of the
cnme.
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If the State has failed to prove any of the above, then you must find the defendant
not guilty of murder. If you rind that all the above have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt then you must find the defendant guilty of murder and decide if
the defendant is guilty of first
murder.

R
Instruction 18
In order for the defendant to be guilty of COllnt 1, Aiding and Abetting First
Degree Murder, the state must prove each of the following:

I. On or about the

4th

day of August, 2008;

2. In the State of Idaho;
3. Jon Allen Kienholz, Jr., did without justification or excuse,
4. Willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, and
5. With malice aforethought and premeditation,
6. Kill Cynthia Bewick, a human being. and
7. The Defendant. COREY SKlI REID. aided and ahetted in the commission of the
cnme.
If the SI:l!'"
failed to
~1l1\ (11' the
then you must fine! t defendant
not guilty of murder. If you find that all the above have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt then you must find the defendant guilty of murder and decide if
the defendant is guilty of first degree murder.

R 323.

Instruction 23
All persons who participate in a crime either before or during its commission, by
intentionally aiding, abetting, advising. hiring, counseling, procuring another to
commit the crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission are gUilty of
the crime. All such participants are considered principals in the commission of
the crime. The participation of each defendant in the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.

II

R
Instruction

'1'0 be an aider and abettor, one must share the criminal intent of the principaL
these must be a community of purpose in the unJavvful undertaking.

R 329.
Instruction 25

If you unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that Jon Allen Kienholz is
guilty of murder and you unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the
state has proven that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and you
unanimoLlsly agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, COREY SKU
REID, aided and abetted in the commission of the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, you must find the defendant, COREY SKII REID, guilty of
Aiding and Abetting First Degree Murder.

If you unanimollsly agree beyond a reasonable doubt that Jon Allen Kienholz is
guilty of murder hut you unanimously agree beyond a reasonahle doubt that the
state has not proven that the murder was willful. deliberate, and premeditated, and
you unanimously agree beyond a reavmablc doubt that the defendant. COREY
SKU REID. aided and abetted in the commission of the murder. you must find tbe
defendant. COR EY SKIl REID. guIlty ,\iding and Abetting Second Degree
Munier.

Nowhere do these instruction" rcqum~ the jury 10 find that Mr Reid shared the mental
state of premeditation with Mr. Kienholz. Rather, when read carefully, the instructions make
clear that Mr. Kienholz must have acted with premeditation. The instructions also make clear
that Mr. Reid must have shared Mr. Kienholz's intent, which would be, of course, the intent to
shoot the victims. See S'tate v. Porter. 142 Idaho 37 L 374, 128 P.3d 908.911 (2005)(lntent to
kill is not a necessary element of murder). But. the instructions do not, in any way, state that Mr.
Reid must have acted with the mental state o/" premeditation. This missing element denied Mr.
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Reid his state and federal constitutIonal rights to due process and to ajury trial. Idaho Const. art.

1,

*~

7 and 13, US Consl. Amends. 5, 6, and 14.
2. Standard

or Revieh'

The defense did not object to the instructions helow. However the isslle of whether Mr.
Reid's constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial were violated when the jury was not
instructed as to premeditation is a matter of fundamental eITor which may addressed for the first
time on appeal.
At the time of the preparation of this hrief, the law of fundamental error is in flux. State
V.

Perr\",

Idaho

P.3d

2010 WL 2880156 (20 I 0), petitioll for rehearing

pending, sets out a restatement of the law of fundamental error which it states is not to be applied
retroactively. However, State

1'.

Longesl,

Idaho

P.3d

2010 WL 3895346.

decided Octoher 6.2010, without comment applies Perry retroactively. It remains to be seen
whether the petition

In

Pe,.,T wiIl be

~ranted

or whether a petition for rehearing will he filed in

Longesl seeking some clarification.
The pre-Perrr law of fundamental error. the la\\ which was in effect at the time Mr. Reid
was tried, and according to the no-retroactivity statement of Perrr, the layv that should apply to
Mr. Reid's case, is that fundamental error may be raised for the first time on appeal.
Fundamental error is an eITor that "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or to
the foundation of the case or takers 1from the defendant a right \vhich was essenti al to his defense
and \vhich no court could or ought to permit him to waive." State

I'.

Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916,

918,854 P.2d 259,261 (1993); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423. 776 P.2d 424. 432 (1989).

Post-Perry fundamental eITOJ' law is as follows:

13

· .. In cases of unobjected to fundamental error ( I) the defendant mLlst
demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's llnwaived constitLltional rights
were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obviolls without the need for any
additional Information as to whether the failure to object was H tactical decision:
and (3) the defendant mllst demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the
oLltcome of the trial proceedings.

State v. Perry, at

* 15.

To demonstrate an effect upon the proceedings, the appellant mllst show

a reasonable possibi lity that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id.
In this case, this Court need not determine whether Perry means what it says when it says
that it is not to be applied retroactively, because under either pre- or post-Per!}' fundamental error

Im\!, there was fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the mental state of premeditation
required for conviction and the error requires reversal.

3. Fllllda!llentall:.;rror Occurred
Due process requires that the state prove every element of the charged offense by proof
beyond a reasonahle doubt. In rc Winship, 397 U.S. 358,90 S. C1. 1068 (1970). Each c1emcnt of
an offense must bc found by a properly instructed jury. Sec State \'. Olin, III Idaho 516,524-30,

725 P.2d 801. 809-15 (Ct. App. 1986).
To prove murder, the state must prove that the defendant acted with intent, specifically,
malice aforethought.

I.e.

~~

18-4001, 18-4002. And, to prove first degree murder, as charged in

this case. the state must prove not only malice, but also premeditation.

I.e.

~

J8-4003(a). R 78-

80.
l'v'lr. Reid was charged as an aider and abettor.

I.e.

§ 18-204. To prove aiding and

abetting the state is required to prove that the aider and abettor shared the mental state of the
principal: there must be a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking. State v. Scroggins,
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110 Idaho 380, 386, 716 P.2d II

,1158 (1985), State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199,204,

P.3d 1209, 1214 (Ct. App. 20(3). "[TJhe aider and abettor must have the requisite intent and
have acted in some manner to bring about the intended result." State v. lv/itch ell, 146 Idaho 378,
383, 195 P.3d 737, 742 (Ct. App. 2(08). This includes the mental state of premeditation for first
degree murder. As set out in I Whmton's Criminal Law, Ch. 4, § 38:
The absence of a mens rea precludes one from being an accomplice. Hence, a law
enforcement officer or informer who feigns friendship or complicity in the
commission of a crime in order to obtain incriminating evidence is not an
accomplice. Similarly a person's mere presence at the time and place of the
commission of a crime, or his knovvledge that a crime is being committed or is
ahout to be committed. without more, docs not make him an accomplice.

See also, State

t·.

ROTzdles, 1 17 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d I 152 (1990), overruled on other grounds,

Slate v. f111l11plirers, 1341daho 657,8 P.3cl652 (2000).
discllssed in Pcople

I'.

McCo\,. 25 CalAth 1111,24 PJd 1210 (Cal. 20(1). to support

a finding of guilt for first degree murder on an aider and abettor theory, the prosecution may not
rely on the mental statc of the actual perpetrator to support intent. malice or prcmeditation.
\\ho aid, '
:lhet~; a LTimc is gui
or thatcrinll' cven if someone
committed some or all of the criminal acts. Because aiders and abettors may be
criminally liable for acts not their ovvn cases have described their liability as
vicariolls. This description is aCCllrate as far as it goes. But the aider and
ahettor's guilt for the intended crime is not entirely vicarious. Rather, that guilt is
based on a combination of the direct perpetrator's acts and the aider and abettor's
OWI1 acts and own mental state. \Vhen a person, with the mental state necessary
for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that person's guilt is
determined by the combined acts of all the patticipants as well as that person's
own mens rea. The aider and abettor is liable for [his or1 her own mens rea, not
the other person's. A defendant charged with murder or attempted murder cannot
be held vicariously !table for the mens rea of an accomplice.

[\ I

25 Cal.4th at 1117,24 P.3d at 1216 (citations and internal quotations omitted, emphasis
original).
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The California Court states that each person's level of guilt '11oats free' not tied to the
mental state or premeditation of the other.

Understandillg Crimina! Law, (2c! ed. 199:'i)

Cal.4th at 1121,

P.3d at 1220, citing Dressler,

*3t)'()6(C), p. 4:'i0.

In fact, the aic!er and abetter's

guilt in homicide cases may be greater than that of the principle jf his or her mens rea is more
culpable or may be less than the guilt of the principle, if his or her mens rea is less culpable.

People v. McCoy, supra.
In this case, the jury Vias instructed as to the criminal intent of malice aforethought.
Instructions 19 and 20. And, the jury was instructed that to be guilty of first degree murder Mr.
Kienholz must have acted Vvith premeditation. Instructions 17 and 18. But the Jury was never
instructed that Mr. Reid, to be guilty of aiding and abetting, hac! to also share the mental state of
premeditation. This was fundamental error that now requires reversal. Sfate v. PelT}', Sllpra.
(I) Constitutional ViolatIOn. Mr. Reld's unwaived constitutional rights to due process
and to a Jury trial \\ere \iolated.

.\s set out above. the failure to instruct the jury that one of the

clement of the charge against Mr. Reid vvas that he have the mental state of premeditation was a
constitutional violation. Moreover, nowhere in the record is there any evidence of any sOl1 that
NIl'. Reid waived his rights to due process. proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a jury trial.
(2) Clear error. The law, as discussed above, is clear that the absence of premeditation by
Mr. Reid precludes conviction for aiding and abetting first degree murder. State v. Scroggins,

sllpra, State v. ROllzem-Garcia. supra, State v. Mitchell, supra, People v. McCoy, supra. The law
is also clear that a jury must be instructed as to every element of the offense. State v. Olin.

supra.
Clear error also requires a demonstration that the el1'or was not a result of a tactical
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decision by the

The record in this case does demonstrate that lack of proper instructions

on the elements of the
to stipulate to

was not a result of a tactical decision. At trial, the defense offered

of the elements of the charge. R 209, Notice of Indisputed Facts. The offer

to stipulate included that on or about August 4,2008. in Shoshone County, Jon Allen Kienholz,
Jr., willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation and with malice, did kill and murder
Neil Howard and Cynthia Bewick. /d. The proposed stipulation did not include any stipulation
as to Mr. Reid's mental state. So, clearly, the defense disputed that element of the charge.
Further, the defense was grounded upon the fact that the state had failed to prove that Mr.
Reid shared the criminal intent of premeditation. Defense counsel's closing argument included
the following:
Your instructions
that you have to find that Mr. Reid, to be guilty of this, had
a combination of an act and an mtent. The acts are those things that are aiding
and abetting, all those acts. And those all have to happen before the - and they
have to be affirmative acts and they have to happen before the murder occurred.
Not afterwards. And they have to be affirmative acts. Those are the - that's the
act.
But then it
to be
with
in\\?nLith
1
intent
someone's going to die. And then, by doing those acts with Jon Kienholz, that
Mr. Reid joined Mr. Kienholz in a union, a meeting of the minds that "We are
going to kill two people." And when did that occur? Your jury instructions say
they have to have shared criminal intent. When did that happen? When did these
two minds come together and they have a shared criminal intent? Even if you
were to believe, which I'm asking you not to, everything that Kienholz, a liar.
said.
Hiram Wilson knew Kienholz through a pretty ShOl1 or rough period of time.
Didn't think he was a very truthful person. I don't think Mr. Wood didn't think
Mr. Kienholz was a truthful person. He lied to law enforcement when he needed
to cover his butt. And so you need to pick out to convict Mr. Reid, you need to
pick out something that Wilson or something that Kienholz said about the time
that Kienholz decided, "These two people are going to die by my hand." And
then that's Kienholz's intent. And you must also find that Mr. Reid had the same
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idea and that he furthered that crime. ]\''1r. Kienholz had to have his intent as
specific as your Jury instructions say. It had to be premeditated. And you have
that defimtion. And it had to be with malice. Mr. Reid. in aiding and abetting this
murder, to be guilty of first degree murder aiding and abetting would also have to
have that same intent. premeditated and with malice. And that those two. if
you're going to find him guilty of tbat, that those two minds. those two intents,
would have to be shared by these two people, that they would have a community
purpose for their undertaking.
Tr. p. 730, In. 13

p. 732, In. 4 .

. . . Jon Kienholz - much of the evidence you saw, especially the worst part of it.
had to do with proving that Jon Kienholz was (sic) premeditated and had malice
aforethought before he murdered these people. Now, his premeditation and
malice aforethought, in the commission of the murder, is not the same. You need
to find that happened, and you need to find Mr. Reiu had malice and
premeditation in the iuea that Kienholz was going to go forward and kill these
people .... He [Kienholz] clearly did pull the tri
. And one version is that
that's right when he made up his mind for the intent to kill, right at that moment.
So if that were believable by you, you would also need to go to that point in time.
and then Mr. Reid already (sic) come up with the idea and acted with the intent to
have those people die that way.
Tr. p. 738. In ..1 - 21.
The defense was mainly hased on the failure of the state to prove premeditation by Mr.
Reid. And. dc

counscl hcllc\cd that the instructions \\efl:

SU

\\orded as

ll)

require prunf uf

premeditation by Mr. Reid inuependently of Mr. Kienho!z's state of mind. It is clear then, that
the defense did not make a tactical decision to not lllstruct the jury that it had to find that Mr.
Reid acted with premeditation.

See iVfcKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,225 P.2e! 700 (20 to).

Rather, the lack of instruction on premeditation on the part of Mr. Reid was a result of
inadvertence, not purpose by the defense.

(3) Reasonable possibility that the elTor affected the outcome. As the defense set out in
closing, the only evidence the state offered to support premeditation by Mr. Reid was the
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testimony of Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Wilson. Mr. Kienholz was a self-admitted liar who told the
state, "I'll testify to vvhatever you want" in retum for avoiding the death penalty. The jury may
reasonably have rejected much or all of what Mr. Kienholz offered at trial. Likevvise, Mr. Wilson
\vas testifying in order to gain a benefit from the state, and the jury could have reasonably
rejected mllch of his testimony. In either of those events, given the lack of any evidence besides
the testimony of these two of premeditation, it is reasonably possible that had the jury been
instructed that it mllst find that Mr. Reid had the mental state of premeditation, it would not have
convicted him of aiding and abetting two first degree murders. Moreover, it is certainly
reasonably possible that one of the twelve jurors would have not been able to find by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Reid acted with premeditation resulting in a hung jury.
Conversely. the jury might ha\'e put more credence in Mr. Wilson's testimony than in Mr.
Kienholz' s. Mr. Wilson testified that the \".hole situation seemed like ajoke and that he did not
helie\e that \Ir. Reid. \VhOlll he kne\\ \\eIL could ever dt) anything like killing anyone. He also
testified that as they \valked to the campsite, Mr. Reid was suggesting that they just leave,just
steal the car and leme. This was probative of a lack of premeditation of murder on Mr. Reid's
part very shortly before 1\'11'. Kienholz killed. If the jury had been properly instructed that it was
required to find Mr. Reid acted with premeditation, it might reasonably have returned, based on
Mr. Wilson's testimony, a different verdict.
Because there was fundamental error in the failure to properly instruct the jury and
because that elTor was not harmless, reversal is now required. State v. Perry, supra.
B. The Erroneous Admission of Photographs Requires Reversal
Reversal is required not only because of instructional elTor. In addition, the elTOneOllS
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admission of certain photographic evidence requires reversal.

I. Relevallt Facts
Prior to trial, the defense moved to exclude certain photos. The grounds for exclusion
included I) that the evidence \vas not relevant as it did not tend to make the existence of any fact
of consequence more probabJe pursuant to IRE 401; 2) the prejudicial value of the e\'idence far
outweighed any possible probative value under IRE 403; 3) the evidence was cumulative since
there was no dispute as to the death of both victims by gunshot wounds: and 4) tbe photos were
so highly prejudicial that curative instructions could not prevent predispositional eflect on the
jury. R 162-163. In support of the motion, Mr. Reid offered to stipulate to the following: 1)
That on or about the

4th

dav of August. 2008, 2)
-'

L.-

~

~

lfl

Shoshone County. ID; 3) Jon Allen Kienholz,
'"

"

Jr., wdlfully. unlawfully, deliberately. with premeditation and with malice; 4) killed and
murdered Neil Howard and Cynthia Bewick. R 209
.\t the argulllent

Ull

210 .

the motion, the defense pointed \Jut that the photographs ,vere terribly

gruesome incn.:asing tl1c prejudicial impact. In thIS case, there was no need for the state to prove
that a murder occurred, as that was conceded, and, e\el1 ignoring that concession, as Mr.
Kienbolz was going to testify (and indeed did testify) that he shot Mr. HO\vard and Ms. Bewick.
Therefore, the state did not need the photos to prove anything. The state did not need to prove
the time or location of the deaths, the nature of the wOLlnds, or even that murder had occurred.
The photos had 110 relevance to proving whether or not Mr. Reid aided and abetted in the killings
as they demonstrated nothing about his presence or state of mind and were highly prejudicial. Tr.
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4/23/09, p.

In. 10 - p.

While some photos were excluded, others were admitted. R 200-201. These included
Plaintiff's Ex. 1

which shO\x,:s Mr. HO\vard's body on the ground. He is laying in a crucifix

posture with his shirt pulled up around his neck and his very bloodied head slightly askew. The
state's witness who presented this photo specifically told the jury that the photo depicted Mr.
Howard "in a kind of cross position,"
State's Exhibit

. n. Tr. p.

, In. 23 - p. 276, In. 9 .

is a particularly gruesome closeup photograph of Mr. Howard's face.

A gunshot wound to his left temple is clearly visible and the top and left side of his head are
covered in dried blood. His lips are parted and blood can be seen on his teeth. But, most
gruesome are the maggot larvae and flies. The state's witness testified 'This shows the dried
blackened blood on his face. You'll see the puncture wound located in his left temple right there.
If you

~

you can see It better in the photograph. but you can see the small larvae that's forming on

his teeth. And what the

the riles come in and la\

the mOLlth, the ears." Ex.
Exhibit

on the soft tissues in the nose. the eyes.

Tr. p. 279. In. 7 - 14.

is a similarly gruesome closeup photograph of Ms. Bewick's face. As the

prosecutor stated to the jury.

is a rather graphic photo. I believe." Tr. p. 282, In. 18 - 19.

All of the photos subject to the motion in limine and later admitted at trial were shown
at the hearing on the motion in limine. See, Tr. p. 28 - p. 99. Those photos are in the record
hefore this Court WIth the numbers they were assigned at trial, which differ from the numbers
assigned at the hearing on the motion in limine. For clarity, this brief refers to the photos by the
exhibit numbers assigned at tlial. The appellate record included all the photos admitted at trial.
To ensure a complete record, Mr. Reid has also filed a motion to augment the appellate record
with the photos as made a part of the record at the motion in limine. See Tr. p. 97, In. 23 - p. 98,
In. 18. Therefore. the record will contain each of the disputed photos twice - once from when
each was subject to the motion in limine, and once from when each was entered as an exhibit at
trial.
I
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Apparently, the prosecutor made this statement so that certain people could be alerted to leave
the coul1room to avoid viewing it. Tr. p. 282, In. 20

23. The state's witness, Detective

Morgan, testi fied:
27 shows a c lose-up of Ci ndy Bewick's face as as it was located on the scene.
You'll see the bloody sweatshirt with blood around her head area. You'll see the
- the pupae, where it's beyond the before the maggot stage and prior to laying
the
This is the same thing. But this is where they were how they eat the
blood, and then they - and also the soft tissue prior to becoming flies. You can
also see a -located right there you can see a puncture yvound that appeared to be
maybe a gunshot wound right there on her left.

And YOL(ll see again with the she was laying more in the shade than in the
bright sunlight, which is which is why her face has more insect activity than
Neal's did at this particular time. He was pretty much in the sunlight, when the
sLln came tip. and she was in the shady areas. And you can also see that note
that the surface animals the crows. the coyotes - ha\'e not eaten the soft tissue
like the lips and the eyes. which is \\here they go for. which is what they eat first.
That would also indicate that she hadn't been there but just several days.

Tr. p.

In.

- p. 28'+. In. :'i.

2. Arglllnelll
Three particularly disturbing photographs were erroneously admitted at trial. The error in
admitting these photos requires a new trial.
State's Exhibit 17 shows M1'. Howard laying on the ground in a "a kind of cross position"
The position of Mr. Howard's body with his arms extended straight out, his Sh111 pulled up to
expose his torso. his Sh0l1s rolled up to just cover his genitals, and his hloodied head lying askew
resting on his len arm is nearly identical to the depiction of Christ in tens of thousands of
crucifixes and paintings. The pose is nearly identical to poses used in posters to advertise Mel
Gibson's Passion of the Christ. Detective Morgan's testimony ensured that the jury would not
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miss this symbolism and feel deeply seated religious emotion when viewing the photo.
State's Exhibit

is a closeup of Mr. tloward's face and shows not only his injuries, but

also "insect activity" including larvae in his teeth. And. Exhibit

was so disturbing that the

prosecutor warned those watching the trial that they might wish to leave. It is a closeup of Cindy
Bewick's face. Her mouth is eovered with insects eating her.
The law regarding the admission of the photographs is set out in State v. Phillips, 117
Idaho 609, 611-l

790 P.2d 392-93 (Ct. App. 1990):

Generally, photographs of a victim in a prosecution for homicide are, in the
discretion of the trial COUlt, admissible as evidence as an aid to the jury in arriving
at a fair understanding of the evidence, proof of the corpus deliciti, extent of
injury, condition and identification of the body, or for their bearing on the
question of degree or atrociousness of the crimes, even though such photographs
may have the additional effect of tending to excite the emotions of the jury. Once
the trial judge determines the relevancy of a photograph, he or she must decide
whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by any inflammatory
effect. Absent an abuse of discretion. the trial court's decisIOn regarding
admission of sLlch photographs will not be chsturbed on appeal.

Id. (citations omitted). See also, Slate

1'.

.','([17("17(':::. [47 Idaho

L 525. 211 P.3c! 130. 134 (Ct.

While photos of the victim are generally admissible, in this case. the three photos
discLlssed above should not have been admitted because even if they were relevant, their
probative vaille \\'as substantially outweighed by inflammatory effect. Id.
The probative value of the photos was at best minimal. The fact of a murder was never in
dispute. Neither was the identity of Mr. Hmvard and Ms. Bewick. The time of death and the
method of death were never in dispute. All was admitted by Mr. Reid and all was testified to by
Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Wilson. The only question in dispute was whether Mr. Reid aided and
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abetted Mr. Kienholz in committing the crimes, m pal1icular whether he shared the mel1S rea of
premeditation. And, not one of these photographs contained any image that would shed any light
on that question. These three photos gave the jury no evidence that had "any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it \vOLIId be without the evidence." IRE 401.
Yet, the prejudicial effect was enormous. It is difficult to imagine more powerfully
persuasive imagery than a photo of a murder victim laid out like Christ on the cross - persuasive
not for purposes of encouraging jurors to carefully weigh evidence and reach a fact based verdict,
but persuasive to avenge a death that has a cultural meaning beyond the death of a single human
being.
Similarly. the photographs of Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick being eaten by insects evoke
powerful emotions.

Ckarh the

pr\)bati\t~

value of these photographs \\C1S substantially outweighed by the

II1flammatory effect and their admission was an abuse of discretion. State v. Phillips, supra, IRE
403.

A similar result was reached in Phillips. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that a
photo of a victim's scalp lying in the snow on the side of the road should not have been admitted
in a vehicular manslaughter prosecution. The Court, in deciding the photo should not have been
allowed. wrote, 'Tbis photograph had no probative value, but carried with it some prejudicial
impact not necessary to prove the manslaughter charges ... " 117 Idaho at 612,790 P.2d at 393
(emphaSIS original).
An Arizona case presents facts very close to those in this case. In State v. Spreitz, 190
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Ariz. 129,945 P.2d 1260 (Ariz. 1(97), the state Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its
discretion in admItting in a murder prosecLltion photographs of the victim's body as it appeared
after decomposing in the desert for three days. The Court noted that the body was discolored and
insects were shO\vn pattly covering it. The Court said that the insect activity was vividly
apparent in the close-ups.

In balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, the Arizona

court noted that the medical examiner had testified clearly about wounds to the victim's body and
that the photos therefore presented little or no advantage to proving matters in dispute.
The photos as described in ,)'preitz. are very similar to the photos admitted in this case. In
both cases, the photos are of bodies which were exposed to the elements and were at the time of
the photos subject to vivid insect activity. And, as in S'preitz., the photos in this case provided
little advantage to the jury in understanding any issue in dispute. Yet they were highly
prejudiCIal and should havc bccn excluded. IRE: 403. Swte \'. Phillips. supra: Slate

'>]Jreitz.,

l' . .

SlIpr([.

The qucstion thcn becomes whether the eITor was harmless. State

l'.

Phillips, supra. The

error IS harmlcss only if this Court finds that the state has established beyond a reasonable doubt
that the \'erdict \vould have been the same without the photographs. Id.
The error is not harmless because the state cannot meet this burden.
While there was no doubt that Mr. Kienholz murdered Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick, as
discusscd ab()\'c. the evidence of that murder alone did not support the aiding and abetting
charges against ;VIr. Reid. The state had no evidence independent of its dubious and inconsistent
accomplice testimony to prove the requisite mental state, premeditation, by Mr. Reid. It cannot
be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same without the
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erroneously admitted photos. [d.
Because It cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have
been the same vvithout the erroneously admitted photographs, reversal is required.

1. Relevant Facts
to use a presentence investigation report (PSI)

At sentencing, the defense and state

prepared for a 2008 conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Tr. p. 758, In. 2 7, p.
786, In, 18

20, That PSI is an exhibit on appeal. R 404.

That PSI repolted a minimal criminal history. Mr. Reid, vvho was 21 at the time of
sentencing, had two prior offenses of tobacco possession/distribution/use by a minor, two alcohol
possessIOn by a rmnor. a failure to provide proof of insurance and failure to register a vehicle, a
possession of drug paraphernalia, and a driv

under the influence. He had no prior violent

offense convictions, PSI p. 3 4.
,\ court

uation

appeaL R 404. That evaluation found that Mr. Reid

al

is

alcohol

ill

the

un

. amphetamine

dependence. cannabis dependence, and cocaine dependence. Ex. Evaluation from Alliance
Fami I)' Services, p. 1
The day of sentencing, the state filed "Documentation in SUppOlt of State's Sentencing
Recommendation." R 354 378. Based upon this documentation, the state asked for a sentence
of life with 40 years fixed. a greater sentence than \vas Imposed
23

p. 768, In. 11, p. 784, In. 1 4.
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011

Mr. Kienholz. Tr. p. 763, In.

The state's documentation was a "draft" Idaho State Police Report which included the
transcript of an unsvvorn interview between Detective Morgan, a deputy prosecuting attorney, and
Ronald Rollins, Jr., conducted on January

2009. R 357. (Mr. Reid's trial \vas held in May

2009.) This interview was highly damaging to Mr. Reid.
There is nothing in this interview to establish Mr. Rollins's credibility or his motivations
other than the fact that he was released from jail early by his probation officer. R 368. All that is
revealed is that he was in jail for some undisclosed period of time on a probation violation and
that he said that he shared a cell \vith Mr. Reid for about a month. R. 357, 371. In the interview,
it is not even clear Mr. Rollins is relating information he claims Mr. Reid shared with him
directly or whether he is just repo11ing jailhouse rumors. R 357

378.

However, Mr. Rollins' interview is highly inconsistent with the evidence the state
presented at Mr. Reid's trial. For example, Mr. Rollins claims that Mr. Reid said that Mr.

Wilsoll kIcked ;\Is. Bewick in the face so that herjaw was 011 to the side and that she pulled
her

0\\11

Ollt

haIr. R.361. Later. Mr. Rollins claims that Mr. Reid changed his story and said that he

had "stepped on" Ms. Bewick's face. R. 362. Yet, at trial, there ,vas no evidence presented either
that Ms. Bewick' s jaw was dislocated or that her hair had been pulled out. Rather. .tv!r. Kienholz
and Mr. Wilson both testified that Mr. Kienholz kicked Ms. Be\vick. Tr. p. 438, In. 24
In. 3, p. 536, In. 15

p.439,

21.

Likewise, Mr. Rollins claims that Mr. Reid told him that "they," apparently he and Mr.
Kienholz, had tried to get a gun before they traded Luke Hill for a gun and had been th\varted in
their efforts when a friend's father caught them trying to get into a locked gun safe. Further,
according to Mr. Rollins. before they got the gun from Mr. Hill, "they" went to Jared Coe's
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hOllse and "something happened there.

R.364. Yet at the trial, there was no evidence presented

that an earlier attempt to get a gun had been thwarted or anything about Jared Coe or something
happening at his house.
Also, and most imp0l1antly, Mr. Rollins claimed that Mr. Reid and Mr. Kienholz's
motive was to steal Mr. Howard's car for their road trip because Mr. Howard refused to give
them the car voluntarily. R 364, 365,373, 376. This motive was not the motive the state
presented at trial. Instead, at trial, the state's evidence was that the motive was to respond to
threats Mr. Hmvard and Ms. Bewick had made to Ms. Purtill. No evidence at all was provided
to

support a moti ve of auto theft.
Mr. Rollins also claimed, contrary to the evidence the state presented at triaL that Mr.

Reid and Mr. Kienholz had planned the murders for two days. R 364-65. Later, he claims that
Mr. Reid said that they had planned the murder for "two, three, several days." R 370. Yet at

tnaL the state's v:itness, Mr. Kienholz testified that the murders were planned on the same day
that they \vere completed.
During the interview, tvlr. Rollins claims that not only did J\'lr. Reid confess to aiding and
abetting, but that he believed that he \vould get off with just probation, that he thought what had
happened at the pass was funny, that he had no remorse, and that he said that Mr. Howard and
Ms. Bewick were "punks" for not giving him and Mr. Kienholz the car and therefore they shot
them. R 359, 361, 364, 365, 376.
At the close of the interview, Mr. Rollins vouched for his own credibility. He agreed
with Detective Morgan that the detective had come to him unexpectedly early the Sunday before
and that they had set up this formal interview. Mr. RoIlins said, ''I'm glad it happened that way,
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better that way. You guys know my credibility is more, if I'd known you guys were coming for a
couple of weeks that person could have, you know, been trying to weasel there (sic) way out or ..

. I knew a lot of the events and I couldn't have known unless I talked to Corey." R 378. Earlier
in the interview. Mr. Rollins said, "1 got out of jail early, but I was asked if I would testify before
anything to the jail was brought up." R 368.
Defense counsel objected to consideration of the Rollins interview. Counsel stated:
The ~ I don't \vant to dwell on this Ronnie Rollins, but it's ~ it's disgusting. I
think it's very poor form to bring that up today. I think it's inflammatory, and I
think it's insulting to the families here today. Ronald Rollins doesn't have little
credibility he has no credibility while giving the statement in jail to get out of
jaIl. None of the things he said was corroborated by Jon Kienholz or Hiram
Wilson there. None of it happened. And I think it's very poor form to bring that
up today. If s a complete lie and fabrication, inconsistent \\'ith every statement of
every witness that's recorded in this case, including Mr. Reid's earliest statement.
And it was all for a pica arrangement WIth Mr. Rollins that never materialized
from thc State.

Tr. P.

no. In.

17 - p.

I. In. :).

The COLIrt considered this objection, but determined to rely on the Rollins interview, at

And Mr Smith quite properly has pointed out that \ve have nothing to judge the
credibility of Mr. Rollins. He's not here. He's not subject to cross-examination.
And I recognize that and recognize that, without live testimony and crossexamination, the statements should be taken with a grain of salt
But one thing that occurred to me, as I was looking through the statements, was
that the statements were made prior to the trial or any real discussion of the facts
of the case. And Mr. Rollins did have a good knowledge of the facts of the case
based upon what he stated that Mr. Reid had told him while they were in jail
together. And so, recognizing that he was not subject to cross-examination, there
is some evidence just from the statements, themselves, that they do have an
element of credibility because he has details that would not have been known to
him except had they been given him by Mr. Reid, as he stated. And I'm referring
there to elements that ~ or detai Is of the facts that came out during the trial.
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Tr. p.

p. 789, In. 19.

In.

In addition to the Rollins interviev" the Court stated that it was going to consider
statements made at the Kienholz sentencing.
The murders have had a tremendous effect on the Bewick and Howard families
and the friends of the victims, as shown by the statement of Ms. Carpenter and the
testimony that was presented at trial and the statements that were made at the
Kienholz sentencing. r recall those statements very well. So, there's a
tremendous effect naturally upon the families of the victims.
Tr. p. 788, In. 1 8.
After considering this information and arguments from counsel, and Mr. Reid's statement
that he did not do enough to stop the crimes from happening and that he \vas very sorry, the
Court sentenced Mr. Reid to life with 30 years fixed, the same sentence imposed on Mr.
Kienholz. Tr. p. 786, In. 9

12; p. 790, In. 18 - p. 791, In. I.

2. Argument

\Vhile the Idaho Rules

or Evidence do not apply

tt)

sentencing hearings, IRE 101

)(3)

and lCR 32(3), a defendant clearly has a due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of
materially incorrect information. United S'/ates \". Peltv, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9 th Cir. 1993). 5'ee
also, State v. ;Ho len , 148 Idaho 950, 961, 231 P.3d 1047, 1058 (Cl. App. 2010).

The due

process clause of the United States Constitution requires that defendants not be sentenced based
on "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92
S.Ct. 489, 492 (1972); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349. 358,97 S.Ct. 1197, 1205
(plurality) (due process applies during sentencing), United States v. PettI', supra. See also, State
v. Molen, supra (conjecture and speculation have no place in a presentence report). Material

information is "unreliable" if it "lacks 'some minimal indicia of reliabi lity beyond mere
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allegation.'" United States v. Iharra,

Baylin, 696F.2d 1030, 1040

827 (9,h Cir. 1(84)(quoting United 5'tates v.

F.2d

Cir. 1(82)). See also, State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho

1,275, 1

P.3d 299, 202 (CL App. 2(00) stating that hearsay must be disregarded at sentencing if there is
no reasonable basis to deem it reliable, as where tbe information is simply conjecture.
In this case, consideration of the Rollins intervie,v at sentencing violated stale and federal
guarantees of due process. It was entirely hearsay and did not bear even minimal indicia of
reliability. In that, it ,vas like the material which ,vas erroneously considered by the sentencing
court in State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,824 P.2d 109 (1991). The Supreme Court vacated the
sentence in Mauro after the district court considered statements in the PSI suggesting the
defendant's participation in a major drug distribution organization. Much of the information
came from the fi les of the United States Attorney's office The Supreme Court noted that the
fact that much of the information came from the U.S. Attorney's office did not make it per se
reliable and \\ithout other

indici~l

of reliahility. the iilformatiol1 contained too much speculation

and conjecture and too little support and should not have heen considered at sentencing. 121
Idaho at 183. 824 P.2d at 114,

In this case, like MUllro, the improper information came from gove1l1ment files

III

Mauro, the files of the U.S. Atto1l1ey; in this case, the files of the police and prosecutor. And, as
in Mauro, that does not mean the information was per se reliable.
Further, as in Mauro, there was no information by \\hich to find the gove1l1ment's
informant credible. There is nothing in this case by which to find that Ml'. Rollins was either a
reliable observer or an honest reporter. To the contrary, all that is known about him is that he
was in jail and that he was released early from jail apparently in connection with his interView,
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But, unlike lv/allro, and more

ously than lv/auro, there were indications that Mr.

Rollins was not credible. As set out above, his statements \vere in very large part inconsistent
with the evidence presented at trial.
The district court did note the complete lack of information to allow it to judge the
credibility of Mr. Rollins. But, then the judge stated that he would consider the interview
because it occurred to him that the interview took place before the trial and that Mr. Rollins had a
"good knowledge of the facts of the case." This conclusion is debatable as Mr. Rollins' version
of events was often at odds with the case the state presented. And, it is logically unsound. The
LlCt that Mr. Rollins had some 1l1formation about the case, most of which was contradicted by the
evidence presented at trial, does not support a conclusion that the interview provided reliable
information. The interview was nothing but hearsay from a completely unknown source. That
sort of hearsay that cannot be considered in sentencing without violating the state and kderal
constitutional rights to due process. '<;tille ,'. l'v/ollm, supm, United States
Based upon this error, the sentence mLlst
resentenc1l1g. ,)'wrc

l'.

110\V

:Yjallf'O, supra.
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1'.

Pell\', supra.

be vacated and the case remanded for

V. CONCLUSION
The convictions in this case must be reversed because the jUly was not instructed as to the
required /!lens rea. The convictions must also be reversed because of the elToneous admission of
photographs.

In the alternative. the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded because it was
based upon unreliable hearsay.
Respectfully submitted this

14~y of October, 2010.

Deborah Whipple
Attorneys for Corey
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day of October 2010, caused two true and
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addressed to:
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-00 I 0
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